This paper is a cryptanalysis of a recently proposed multi-chaotic systems based image cryptosystem. The cryptosystem is composed of two shuffling stages parameterized by chaotically generated sequences. We propose and implement two different attacks which completely break this encryption scheme.
Introduction
Chaotic systems exhibit many suitable properties that make them applicable to the design of encryption schemes. Among the parallels between the properties of chaotic systems and those of cryptosystems are [1] :
1. Sensitivity to initial conditions ! A small deviation in the plaintext results in a large change in the ciphertext. 2. Deterministic dynamic and pseudo-random aspect of a chaotic signal ! A deterministic process (in a cryptosystem) can cause a pseudo-random behavior. 3. Ergodicity of a chaotic signal ! The performance of an encryption algorithm has the same distribution for any plaintext.
As a result, many proposals dealing with both cryptography and chaos have been published in the last twenty years [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Some of them have been cryptanalysed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] and have been found to be not secure [10] [11] [12] [13] .
In this paper, we cryptanalyze the image cryptosystem recently proposed in [2] . The cryptosystem uses the Henon, the Lorenz, the Chua and the Rössler chaotic systems to generate shuffling sequences. However, this was not enough to make the cryptosystem secure. Indeed, the use of these systems was only for generating pseudo-random sequences that are used to rearrange the pixel bits of the plain image. Hence, the cryptosystem under study can be viewed as a pure shuffling algorithm that can be broken using a method similar to the one developed in [14] . In the present paper, in order to break the image cryptosystem, we propose two different attacks specific to this scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief description of the cryptosystem proposed in [2] . Section 3 gives an equivalent description of the cryptosystem that makes it simpler to analyze. Using the equivalent description, a chosen ciphertext attack and a known-plaintext attack are given. Simulations results are given in Section 4. The paper concludes with final remarks in Section 5.
Description of the cryptosystem
The cryptosystem proposed in [2] shuffles plaintext image bits using chaotic systems. The shuffling parameters are generated by the iterations of four 3D chaotic systems. The key of the cryptosystem is the set of 12 initial conditions for the chaotic maps. The parameters of the chaotic systems are fixed and public.
The shuffling is performed in two stages. In the first stage, designated bits of all the pixels are shuffled. In the second stage, the bits of each pixel are shuffled among themselves.
We now give the detailed descriptions of each stage. 
Plaintext preparation
The original plaintext is a m Â n RGB image with each pixel color represented as a byte. For the purpose of encryption, the plaintext is first vectorized using the usual row scan. The resulting vector is a N Â 1 vector of bytes, where N ¼ mn. In order to manipulate the bits of pixels, the vector is further split into its bits, resulting in a N Â 8 plaintext matrix, where each entry takes values 0 or 1. In the cryptosystem proposed in [2] , each color component is processed independently. Arb; Agb; Abb 2 f0; 1g NÂ8 denote respectively the Red, Green and Blue components of the vectorized and binarized image.
Key preparation
The four chaotic systems are iterated N times to generate 12 sequences of length N each. Each of these sequences are sorted and the indices of the sorted numbers in the original sequences give the sorting sequences Here, x 1 ; y 1 ; z 1 are the sequences of real numbers generated by the Henon chaotic system. Likewise, x 2 ; y 2 ; z 2 are generated by the Lorenz system, x 3 ; y 3 ; z 3 are generated by the Chua system and finally x 4 ; y 4 ; z 4 are generated by the Rössler system.
For example, if x 1 ¼ f2:7; À0:4; 1:7; 0:1g, then the sorting sequence is given as Fx 1 ¼ f2; 4; 3; 1g because that is the indices of the ordered elements.
Note that the sequences Fx i ; Fy i ; Fz i ; 1 6 i 6 4, depend nonlinearly on the secret initial conditions. Also note that each sorting sequence defines a permutation over the set of integers f1; 2; . . . ; Ng.
Encryption

Vertical shuffling
Each column of the matrix Arb is shuffled using one of the sequences ArbðFx 4 ðiÞ; jÞ; j ¼ 7; 8:
The same vertical shuffling is applied to the green and blue components Agb and Abb with the shuffling sequences Fy 1 ; Fy 2 ; Fy 3 ; Fy 4 and Fz 1 ; Fz 2 ; Fz 3 ; Fz 4 , respectively. After the vertical shuffling, we end up with Aerb; Aegb and Aebb.
Horizontal shuffling
In this step, the rows of Aerb; Aegb and Aebb are shuffled horizontally. This corresponds to the shuffling of pixel bits among themselves.
For the shuffling of the ith row of red component, the sorting sequence for 4 numbers Fx 1 ðiÞ; Fx 2 ðiÞ; Fx 3 ðiÞ; Fx 4 ðiÞ are used. If the sorting sequence is fj 1 ; j 2 ; j 3 ; j 4 g; the ith row is shuffled into the row BrbðiÞ ¼ ½Aerbði; 2j 1 Þ; Aerbði; 2j 1 À 1Þ; Aerbði; 2j 2 Þ; Aerbði; 2j 2 À 1ÞAerbði; 2j 3 Þ; Aerbði; 2j 3 À 1Þ;
Aerbði; 2j 4 Þ; Aerbði; 2j 4 À 1Þ;
where BrbðiÞ denotes the ith row of the N Â 8 binary matrix of the ciphertext red component. The red component Br of the ciphered image B is obtained by first concatanating the bits in each row of Brb to obtain the pixels in vector format and then reshaping the vector into a m Â n ciphered image.
A similar shuffling of the pixel bits is applied to the green and blue components Aegb and Aebb with the sorting sequences derived from Fy and Fz, respectively.
The final ciphered image B is obtained by joining all three color components Br; Bg and Bb.
Cryptanalysis
In this section, we give chosen-plaintext and known-plaintext attacks against the cryptosystem. Both of the attacks yield the sorting sequences Fx; Fy and Fz with very little amount of computation. We first give an equivalent representation of the encryption algorithm using permutation functions.
Equivalent representation
As claimed in [2] , the security of the cryptosystem relies on the secrecy of the initial conditions driving the four chaotic systems. A naive attack on the cryptosystem might try to reveal those initial conditions. However, if an attacker knows the sorting sequences Fx; Fy and Fz, he can decrypt the ciphered image. Thus, the sorting sequences are the equivalent keys of the cryptosystem. Instead of attacking the initial conditions, the attacker devises methods to reveal the sorting sequences.
At first glance, it might seem that, by using the equivalent representation, we have unnecessarily increased the number of secret parameters. Indeed, in the original proposal there are 12 secret keys. Since each sorting sequence defines a permutation over N elements, the new key space has ðN!Þ 3 elements. Obviously, this is a lot larger than what is necessary to preclude a brute-force attack. However, as we show in the sequel, attacking the sorting sequences is very easy compared to attacking the secret initial conditions. The horizontal shuffling of bits within the ith pixel of Aerb uses the sorting sequence that orders the four numbers Fx 1 ðiÞ; Fx 2 ðiÞ; Fx 3 ðiÞ; Fx 4 ðiÞ. Let us denote this sequence by h i . When the sequences Fx are known, h i can be trivially constructed. Even when the attacker does not know Fx, if he can devise a method to reveal the sorting sequences h i ; 1 6 i 6 N, it will be enough to break the horizontal shuffling stage of the algorithm.
Therefore, we can treat the cryptosystem as if it has two sets of independent secret parameters; the set of 12 sorting sequences Fx; Fy; Fz used in the vertical shuffling and the set of N sorting sequences h i ; 1 6 i 6 N, used in horizontal shuffling.
We note that the vertical and horizontal shuffles do not separate the bit pairs (1, 2), (3, 4), (5, 6) and (7, 8) . Namely, the 1st and the 2nd bits of a pixel are shuffled together and so on. Hence, we can define a new N Â 4 plain image P, where each entry Pði; jÞ takes values in {0, 1, 2, 3}.
The encryption first shuffles each column of P within itself. Let us define four permutation functions p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; p 4 corresponding to Fx 1 ; Fx 2 ; Fx 3 and Fx 4 , respectively. Namely, the first column of P is shuffled using the permutation p 1 and so on.
Denote by M the vertically shuffled image. Hence, we have Mðp j ðiÞ; jÞ ¼ Pði; jÞ; 1 6 i 6 N; 1 6 j 6 4:
Let us also define the horizontal permutation r i corresponding to the sorting sequence h i . Namely, the ith row of the intermediate im-
age M is shuffled using the permutation r i . Thus, we have Cði; r i ðjÞÞ ¼ Mði; jÞ; 1 6 i 6 N; 1 6 j 6 4:
Since the horizontal shuffles permute the row p j ðiÞ, using (3) and (4), we obtain the overall expression for the encryption as
Cðp j ðiÞ; r p j ðiÞ ðjÞÞ ¼ Pði; jÞ; 1 6 i 6 N; 1 6 j 6 4:
In this new representation, P is the N Â 4 plain image and C is the ciphered image. Comparing with expression of the algorithm in (1), P is the two-bit stuck version of Arb, e.g. if Arb has [0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0] in a row, the corresponding row in P is [1, 2, 3, 2] . Note that this is the same as expressing binary matrix Arb, in base 4, i.e. P 2 Z NÂ4 4 .
Chosen-plaintext attack
In the chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker chooses a plain image and somehow obtains the corresponding ciphered image. By analyzing the plain-ciphered image pair, he tries to reveal the secret parameters.
Since each color component of the plain image is processed independently, we give the attack only for the red component. In this case, the attack reveals the permutations p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; p 4 and r i ; 1 6 i 6 N. The other color components are analyzed similarly to reveal the rest of the sorting sequences.
For the purpose of the attack, we can take the plain image as the N Â 4 matrix P and the ciphered image as the N Â 4 matrix C.
Revealing the horizontal sorting sequences
In order to bypass the vertical shuffling, the attacker chooses the original plain image A such that P satisfies Pði; 1Þ ¼ 0; Pði; 2Þ ¼ 1; Pði; 3Þ ¼ 2; Pði; 4Þ ¼ 3;
Namely, all the entries in the jth column of P has the value j À 1. Note that this corresponds to choosing the original image A with each pixel of all three color components equal to 27.
Obviously, P remains unchanged under vertical column shuffling. Hence,
M ¼ P:
The horizontal shuffling r i permutes the ith row of P. Since each entry in the row is distinct, the location of the entries in the ith row of C reveals the permutation r i .
In order to better see how this choice of plaintext reveals the secret permutation r i , assume that the attacker observes Similarly, by comparing every row of C with (6), the attacker reveals r i ; 1 6 i 6 N.
Revealing the vertical sorting sequences
Now that the attacker knows r i ; 1 6 i 6 N, he can invert the horizontal shuffling. Hence, once the attacker observes C, he can obtain the output M of the vertical shuffling operation.
This time the attacker chooses the plain image P such that PðiÞ ¼ 0; 0; 0; 0;
Pði þ 1Þ ¼ 1; 1; 1; 1; ð7Þ Pði þ 2Þ ¼ 2; 2; 2; 2;
and all the other entries of P are identically 3. Comparing P with M that he obtained by the inverse horizontal shuffling of C, the attacker reveals the permutations p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; p 4 . In order to see how this is done, assume that the attacker observes that for some i 1 Continuing in the same fashion, the entries i; i þ 1 and i þ 2 of p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; p 4 are revealed.
For each i 2 f1; 4; 7; . . .g; i < N, the attacker chooses a plain image using (7) and obtains the corresponding ciphered image. In each case, he reveals 12 entries (4 entries for each of the three color components) of the secret sorting sequences. In total, the attacker needs dN=3e chosen plain images to reveal the vertical shuffling parameters. Considering the single plain image used in revealing r i 's, the attack takes a total of dN=3e þ 1 chosen plain images.
Known-plaintext attack
In some cases, it might be impossible for the attacker to choose the plain images but instead the attacker may know some pairs of (plain/ciphered) images. Extracting information about the secret parameters using known plaintexts is known as known-plaintext attack.
In this section, we assume that the attacker somehow obtains some ðP; CÞ pairs. The aim of the attack is to reveal the secret parameters p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; p 4 and r i ; 1 6 i 6 N.
Revealing the vertical shuffling sequences
Suppose the attacker knows t (plain/ciphered) images pairs ðP 1 ; C 1 Þ; ðP 2 ; C 2 Þ; . . . ; ðP t ; C t Þ. Further assume that the attacker observes that for a particular plain image coordinates ði; jÞ and a particular pair ðP k ; C k Þ,
Namely, the value of the plaintext at P k ði; jÞ appears in the r k ciphertext locations ði 1 ; j 1 Þ; ði 2 ; j 2 Þ; . . . ; ði r k ; j r k Þ. So, the permutation p j must have mapped i to one of i 1 ; i 2 ; . . . ; i r k . Hence, p j ðiÞ 2 R k ¼ fi 1 ; i 2 ; . . . ; i r k g:
Using similar observations for the other pairs, we obtain other sets that include p j ðiÞ. Intersecting these sets R k , we have Repeating this set intersection method for all i; j; 1 6 i 6 N; 1 6 j 6 4, the attacker reveals all the secret quantities p j ðiÞ.
Revealing the horizontal shuffling sequences
Once the attacker reveals the 4 permutations p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 and p 4 , he goes on to reveal the horizontal permutation functions r 1 ; r 2 ; . . . ; r N .
Note that each horizontal permutation is defined over the set {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The attacker uses the vertical permutations to obtain the intermediate images M 1 ; M 2 ; . . . ; M t . The relation between M k and C k is given as 
